5
" We grasp external space through our bodily situation. A "corporeal or postural schema" gives us at every moment a global, practical, and implicit notion of the relation between our body and things, of our hold on them. A system of possible movements, or "motor projects* radiates from us to our environment. Our body is not in space like things; it inhabits or haunts space. It applies itself to space like a hand to an instrument, and when we wish to move about we do not move the body as we move an object. We transport it without instruments as if by magic, since it is ours and because through it we have direct access to space. For us the body is much more than an instrument or a means; it is our expression in the world, the visible form of our intentions. Even our most secret affective movements, those most deeply tied to the
humoral infrastructure, help to shape our perception of things. "
― Maurice Merleau-Ponty , The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics
6
" We must rediscover the structure of the perceived world through a process similar to that of an
archaeologist. For the structure of the perceived world is buried under the sedimentations of later knowledge. Digging down to the perceived world, we see that sensory qualities are not opaque, indivisible "givens," which are simply exhibited to a remote consciousness—a favorite idea of classical philosophy. We see too that colors (each surrounded by an affective atmosphere which psychologists have been able to study and define) are themselves different modalities of our co-existence with the
world. We also find that spatial forms or distances are not so much relations between different points in objective space as they are relations between these points and a central perspective—our body. In
short, these relations are different ways for external stimuli to test, to solicit, and to vary our grasp on the world, our horizontal and vertical anchorage in a place and in a here-and-now. We find that perceived
things, unlike geometrical objects, are not bounded entities whose laws of construction we possess a priori, but that they are open, inexhaustible systems which we recognize through a certain style of development, although we are never able, in principle, to explore them entirely, and even though they never give us more than profiles and perspectival views of themselves. Finally, we find that the perceived world, in its turn, is not a pure object of thought without fissures or lacunae; it is,
rather, like a universal style shared in by all perceptual beings. While the world no doubt coordinates these perceptual beings, we can never
presume that its work is finished. Our world, as Malebranche said, is an "unfinished task."
If we now wish to characterize a subject capable of this perceptual experience, it obviously will not be a self-transparent thought, absolutely present to itself without the interference of its body and its history. The perceiving subject is not this absolute thinker; rather, it functions according to a natal pact between our body and the world, between ourselves and our body. Given a perpetually new natural and historical situation to control, the perceiving subject undergoes a continued birth; at each instant it is something new. Every incarnate subject is like an open notebook in which we do not yet know what will be written. Or it is like a new language; we do not know what works it will accomplish but only that, once it has appeared, it cannot fail to say
little or much, to have a history and a meaning. The very productivity or freedom of human life, far from denying our situation, utilizes it and turns it into a means of expression. "
― Maurice Merleau-Ponty , The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics
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" Language leads us to a thought which is no longer ours alone, to a thought which is presumptively universal, though this is never the universality of a pure concept which would be identical for every mind. It is rather the call which a situated thought addresses to other thoughts, equally situated, and each one responds to the call with its own resources...
When a writer is no longer capable of thus founding a new universality and of taking the risk of communicating, he has outlived his time. It seems to me that we can also say of other institutions that they have ceased to live when they show themselves incapable of carrying on a poetry of human relations—that is, the call of each individual freedom to all the others...
The linguistic relations among men should help us understand the more general order of symbolic relations and of institutions, which assure the exchange not only of thoughts but of all types of values, the co-existence of men within a culture and, beyond it, within a single history...Our life is essentially universal. "
― Maurice Merleau-Ponty , The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics
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" The notions of Nature and Reason,...far from explaining the metamorphoses which we have observed from perception up to the more complex
modes of human exchange, make them incomprehensible. For by relating them to separated principles, these notions mask a constantly
experienced moment, the moment when an existence becomes aware of itself, grasps itself, and expresses its own meaning.
The study of perception could only teach us a "bad ambiguity," a mixture of finitude and universality, of interiority and exteriority. But there is a "good ambiguity" in the phenomenon of expression, a spontaneity which accomplishes what appeared to be impossible when we observed only the separate elements, a spontaneity which gathers together the plurality of monads, the past and the present, nature and culture into a single whole. To establish this wonder would be metaphysics itself and would at the same time give us the principle of an ethics. "
― Maurice Merleau-Ponty , The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics
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" Schilder observes that, smoking a pipe before a mirror, I feel the sleek, burning surface of the wood not only where my fingers are but also in those otherwordly figures, those merely visible ones inside the mirror. The mirror's phantom draws my flesh into the outer world, and at the same time the invisible of my body can invest its psychic energy in the other bodies I see. Hence my body can include elements drawn from the body of another, just as my substance passes into them; man is a mirror for man. Mirrors are the instruments of a universal magic that converts things into spectacle, spectacle into things, myself into another and another into myself. "
― Maurice Merleau-Ponty , The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics
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" There is a paradox of immanence and transcendence in perception. Immanence, because the perceived object cannot be foreign to him who perceives; transcendence, because it always contains something more than what is actually given. And these two elements of perception are not, properly speaking, contradictory. For if we reflect on this
notion of perspective, if we reproduce the perceptual experience in our thought, we see that the kind of evidence proper to the perceived, the
appearance of "something," requires both this presence and this absence. "
― Maurice Merleau-Ponty , The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics
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" It is true that we arrive at contradictions when we describe the perceived world. And it is also true that if there were such a thing as a non-contradictory thought, it would exclude the world of perception as
a simple appearance. But the question is precisely to know whether there is such a thing as logically coherent thought or thought in the pure state...One of Kant's discoveries, whose consequences we have not yet fully grasped, is that all our experience of the world is throughout a tissue of concepts which
lead to irreducible contradictions if we attempt to take them in an absolute sense or transfer them into pure being, and that they nevertheless found the structure of all our phenomena, of everything which
is for us...I wish only to point out that the accusation of contradiction is not decisive, if the acknowledged contradiction appears as the very condition of consciousness...There is a vain form of contradiction which consists in affirming two theses which exclude one another at the same time and under the same aspect. And there are philosophies which show contradictions present at the very heart of time and of all relationships. There is the sterile non-contradiction of formal logic and the justified contradictions of transcendental logic. The objection with which we are concerned would be admissible only if we could put a system of eternal truths in the place of the perceived world, freed from its contradictions. "
― Maurice Merleau-Ponty , The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics
The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics