1
" Looking back at the knowledge economies discussed earlier, we can recognize that the dynamic coupling of human societies and the Earth system not only depended on the generation of knowledge, but enhanced, in turn, the significance of that generation. In a process extending over millennia, scientific knowledge eventually became a crucial component of economic growth; it is now becoming no less important in coping with its consequences. Substantial anthropogenic change on a global scale was evidently already characteristic of the Holocene and the late Pleistocene, from the human-induced extinction of great mammals via Neolithization and urbanization to the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions. What characterizes the Anthropocene is the need to actively prevent the Earth system from transgressing planetary boundaries. The emergence of this need is closely related to the cascade of evolutionary processes described above. Just as cultural evolution started as a side-show of biological evolution before it became the conditio humana (the essential condition of human life), epistemic evolution, that is, the growing dependence of human societies on knowledge economies producing scientific knowledge, was, for a long time, no more than a tangential aspect of cultural evolution. But with the onset of the Anthropocene, the survival of human culture as we know it hinges on this. "
― , The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene
2
" Neither the onset of epistemic evolution nor that of the Anthropocene can easily be assigned a singular date, cause, or origin. From this perspective, the primary question is less what or who caused the Anthropocene but how humanity can live with it. Each potential genesis proposed above catches important aspects of the long-term historical development that drove us and the planet we inhabit into this new stage. There is nog question that power, violence, exploitation, and oppression were crucial factors. In examining the dark side of history, we see indeed that not all cats are gray; we may well distinguish the oppressors and the oppressed. But identifying causes and culprits does not necessarily put us into a better position for predicting which solutions are equal to the challenges of the Anthropocene. We cannot simply bail out or excuse ourselves from the evolution of knowledge, but we may attempt to understand it better, including the detailed pathways that have brought us to where we now stand - and whence we will be launched into the future. "
― , The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene
3
" System knowledge alone tends to favor technocratic visions; transformation knowledge by itself may encourage blind activism; orientation knowledge without system and transformation knowledge is idle. But even the combination of these types of knowledge will be useless as long as they are not implemented within a suitable knowledge economy, comprising research, education, public discourse, and political action.
Much of the needed knowledge is unavailable - either because it is inaccessible, suppressed, or unimplemented, or because it does not yet exist or has been lost. Even in the face of global challenges, there will not be just one way into the future, but various modes of bringing together the richness and diversity of human experiences. New form of knowledge, as well as new forms of individual and social life ready to meet the challenges of the Anthropocene (including new strategies for knowledge production and energy provision, for dealing with social justice and the flow of materials, for health care en traffic, etc) will not simply follow from a radical 'paradigm shift'. They will rather result from exploration processes that may eventually form a matrix. thus giving birth to new insights and forms of life that we could not have anticipated. "
― , The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene
4
" But however desirable an evolutionary framework for a history of knowledge may be, the important questions is whether it is actually possible to recognize an evolutionary logic in the historical records - without imposing it by an exaggerated analogy with biology and without ascending to a level of abstraction where all cats become gray. I believe that the historical findings examined in the preceding chapters point in such a direction, in particular the long-term, cumulative aspects of knowledge development, its dependence on contingent societal contexts, and the profound transformations of the architecture of knowledge.
Examples are the emergence of new systems of knowledge from a reorganization of preceding systems; the sedimentation and plateau-building processes of knowledge economies; the transformation of contingent circumstances and challenges into internal conditions for the further development of knowledge systems, accounting for the path dependency and layered structure of this development; and the feedback mechanisms that may arise between knowledge economies and knowledge systems, giving rise to the emergence of new epistemic communities.
Just like the evolution of life, knowledge development has direction but us not globally uniform. It is neither deterministic nor teleological. Chance events may have long-term effects by becoming incorporated into the developmental process. Knowledge development is self-referential insofar as it contributes to shaping its own environment by processes of sedimentation and plateau formation corresponding to niche construction in biology. It is also a layered process, in the sense that later forms of knowledge do not necessarily replace earlier ones. External representations shape the long-term transmission of knowledge, ensuring its continuity, while their exploration under different circumstances opens up possibilities for variation and change. "
― , The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene
5
" While the technosphere concept stresses that most humans lack the potential to influence the behavior of large technological systems, the ergosphere concept makes this possibility dependent on the existence of appropriate social and political structures and knowledge systems, and also on the individual perspectives of human actors. One cause for hope is that a knowledge economy produces and distributes not only the knowledge needs for its functioning (and often less) but, to varying degrees, an excess of knowledge (an 'epistemic spillover') that may trigger unexpected developments.
Humans must certainly maintain and preserve their tools, technologies, and infrastructures, but they also change them with each implementation. The material world of the ergosphere consists of borderline objects between nature and culture that may trigger innovations as well as unpredictable consequences. The ergosphere has a plasticity and porousness in which materials and functions are not so tightly interwoven as to exclude the repurposing of existing tools for new applications. In principle, each aspect of the ergosphere can be transformed from an end into a means, which is then available to emerging intentions and functions. Repurposing a given tool is, however, a double-edged sword - it may have disastrous consequences. Thus, the responsibility for using and developing technical systems must always be assumed anew. "
― , The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene
6
" In his recent critique of fashionable ecological philosophies, Andreas Malm pointedly remarks: 'When Latour writes that, in a warming world, 'humans are no longer submitted to the diktats of objective nature, since what comes to them is also an intensively subjective form of action,' he gets it all wrong: there is nothing intensively subjective but a lot of objectivity in ice melting. Or, as one placard at a demonstration held by scientists at the American Geophysical Union in December 2016: 'Ice has no agenda - it just melts.''
The reverse claim is that human interventions have only had such a menacing and even fatal consequences for our living conditions within the Earth system because human agency has not yet sufficiently freed itself from its dependence on natural history. This seems to be the conviction behind the 'Ecomodernist Manifesto,' for instance, which claims that 'knowledge and technology, applied with wisdom, might allow for a good, even great, Anthropocene,' and that a good Anthropocene 'demands that humans use their growing social, economic, and technological powers to make life better for people, stabilize the climate, and protect the natural world.'
In this confrontation, an age-old dualism has assumed a new guise: the attempt to establish a complicity with the forces of destiny - if necessary at the price of surrendering human subjectivity or perhaps involving other forms of self-sacrifice - is juxtaposed with the attempt to achieve human autonomy by subordinating the planet under the superior power of human ingenuity. These two positions, a modernist stance and a position critical of it, are usually considered to represent mutually exclusive alternatives. Actually, however, the two positions have more in common than first meets the eye.
At the beginning of chapter 3, I referred to Greek philosophers who suggested that the best way to protect oneself against the vicissitudes of fate was to learn how to submit oneself to it willingly, sacrificing one's drives and ambitions while expecting, at the same time, that this complicity with destiny would empower one to master worldly challenges. What unites the seemingly opposite positions, more generally speaking, is a shared move away from engagement with the concrete and individual human agency (i.e., with empirical human subjects and with the unequal power distribution in human societies) toward some powerful form of abstraction, be it 'to distribute agency' or to use the 'growing social, economic, and technological powers' of humanity for a better Anthropocene. I suggest that we take a more systemic look at the role of humanity in the Earth system, taking into account both its material interventions and the knowledge that enabled them. "
― , The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene
8
" The technosphere is described here as if neither history nor social or political dynamics mattered. It does not take into account collective agency or political, economic, and social structures, let alone the evolution of knowledge with its powerful impact on shaping technological systems. Has human technology now reached a stage (or will it any time soon) at which it attains the autonomy of an organism with its own agency - an autopoietic structure reproducing its own organization? Such generalizations tend to overlook some essential features of human interaction with the global environment.
For instance, while the biosphere has proven its resilience over the course of at least 3.5 billion years of evolution, the technosphere may turn out to be a rather fragile scaffolding for human existence. While it is quite conceivable that the sum total of the unintended consequences of our actions has developed its own dynamics, even in the age of the Anthropocene escape routes may still be left to us - an observation, however, that does not imply, vice versa, that there will be a guarantee for the existence of an escape route. It rather appears that the dynamics underlying the Anthropocene might well enhance both the challenges with which we are confronted and our opportunities to react to them, leaving the question open as to whether the latter will always be sufficient to match the former. Is it possible, for instance, that geoengineering can intervene in the planetary system to the point that a new state of the planetary system would be reached in which high carbon dioxide concentration, radioactive pollution, and other unintended consequences of industrialization are no longer challenging problems but can be safely kept under control by novel technologies? Given the fact that macro-scale interventions in the Earth system are beyond anything that human engineering has achieved so far, and given the fact that there are still important gaps in our knowledge about our planetary system, we are certainly on the safer side to prioritize, at least for the time being and to the extent that it is possible at all, the preservation of our existing Earth system and damage control. "
― , The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene
9
" The problem is also not, as suggested by the technosphere concept, that human beings are incapable of controlling systems that have a larger range of behaviors than they do themselves. The problem rather lies in the question of what 'control' means in the first place. The stewardship of technological systems and infrastructures always depends on their specific nature (in particular, the way they are embedded in natural and cultural environment) as well as on their representation in knowledge and belief systems. Human cognition is always embodied cognition. There are historical examples showing that humans have been able to manage and sustain extremely complex ecologies and infrastructures of their own making over the long term. The systems' potential behaviors always far exceeded those of their human components, but these were typically ecologies and infrastructures in which the relevant regulative structures of human behavior had themselves been coevolving over long periods, including in their representation by knowledge and belief systems.
As recent work on Japanese ecologies during the Tokugawa period (between 1603 and 1868) shows, age-old traditions had accumulated knowledge on how to sustainably manage a complex landscape providing humans with food, shelter, clothing, and energy. The knowledge was implemented through a complex system of governance and material practices ranging from sanitation to publishing. "
― , The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene
10
" The essential point is that systems of knowledge are never given in their entirety at the outset of an investigation. Their meaning unfolds only gradually, through the exploration of their implications with the help of external representations - for example, by doing calculations, applying a conceptual framework to new circumstances, exposing systems to debate within an epistemic community, and so forth. We therefore speak of the 'generative ambiguity' of external representations, which leads to their seemingly paradoxical function in knowledge transmission: on the one hand, they secure and stabilize the transmission of knowledge over generations, thus ensuring its longevity, while they serve, on the other hand, as tools for thinking and thus agents of change and innovation in the transmission of knowledge. "
― , The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene
