Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power QUOTES

1 " The Saudi experience with IBI, though brief, proved instrumental and became a model for how the Saudis went on to conduct business. Saudi Arabia understood that it lacked the resources of more developed nations. These included a large population, an educated populace, capital, credit,
and native businesses. What Saudi Arabia realized it did have was an immense quantity of a very desirable resource: petroleum. Because it lacked so many resources, it could not drill for, extract, refine, transport, or sell that petroleum on its own. It needed outside firms to access the value of the petroleum, at least initially. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

2 " In 1979, while Saudi Arabia was in the midst of a process of
liberalization, a group of religious fanatics seized the Grand Mosque in
Mecca. The Masjid al-Haram houses the kaaba, considered the holiest sitefor Muslims. This incident was a national trauma and transformative for al Saud, who reacted to it with an increased religious traditionalism enforced by the government and spearheaded by the ulama. Ambassador Smith credited a clear transformation to what occurred in 1979. “Saudi Arabia started going ultraconservative after the takeover of the Holy Mosque. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

3 " The Saudis considered the petroleum under their soil a gift from God, but accessing its value laid within man’s capacity. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

4 " The Saudis considered the petroleum under their soil a gift from God, but accessing its value laid within man’s capacity. Until the Saudis developed the capabilities themselves, they would simply import the human capital they needed to make that petroleum valuable. This meant importing
Aramco to run the oil industry, IBI and, later, other companies to build modern cities and transportation, and even American financial advisors to create a modern banking system. The trick was to buy what they did not
have from the outside, and then to make it their own. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

5 " Another casualty of Feisal’s return to power was Abdullah Tariki, the general director of petroleum and mineral resources. Tariki is a well-known figure in global oil politics, mostly because in 1960 he cofounded, along with Venezuelan oil minister Juan Perez Alfonso, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, better known as the OPEC cartel. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

6 " When Abdul Aziz captured Riyadh in 1902, the city consisted of only one square kilometer; a century later, Riyadh had grown to 1,300 square kilometers. When Abdul Aziz consolidated his kingdom in 1932, Riyadh had a population of fewer than forty thousand. By the beginning of the 21st century, its population approached six million. Riyadh became a bustling,modern city with terrible traffic, upscale malls, and neighborhoods stratified by class and wealth. In 1932, the man who ruled Saudi Arabia from Riyadh had barely a riyal to his name, but Abdul Aziz’s sons, the succeeding rulers of Arabia, would enjoy immense wealth and come to own the most profitable company in the world—Saudi Aramco. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

7 " To maintain his rule, King Abdul Aziz had to show the people of Saudi Arabia, in material ways, that they were his subjects. Without the funds to do so, his rule would crumble. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

8 " Abdul Aziz did not have a funeral. Foreign dignitaries, prominent tribesmen, wealthy oil executives, and jealous Arab strongmen did not come to pay their respects. Funeral prayers were recited in Taif and then
Abdul Aziz was buried without fanfare in an essentially unmarked grave in Riyadh. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

9 " During his life, Feisal had only three wives or possibly four, in contrast to his brother Saud, who had forty-one wives, according to the King Saud Foundation. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

10 " Tariki had proven his worth when he worked with Abdullah Sulaiman in the 1950s to recover millions of dollars of revenue for Saudi Arabia in the oil pricing controversy that followed the 50-50 profit-sharing deal. With Tariki in charge of petroleum
relations, however, his brazen and confrontational style stood in stark contrast to Sulaiman’s measured scheming and complete devotion to his
king. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

11 " It is worth stating clearly and unambiguously what official U.S. government spokespersons have not: For years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for Al Qaeda; and for years, Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

12 " During his tenure as king, from 2005 to 2015, Abdullah did promote women’s education with the royal scholarship program that offered full scholarships to women, as well as men, to travel abroad for university degrees. However, he did not end the prohibition against women driving or relax many other restrictions on women. Only two and a half years after King Abdullah’s death, his brother, King Salman, assisted by his 32-year-old son, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, decreed that Saudi women would be permitted to obtain driver’s licenses starting in June 2018. Other restrictions that hindered women from accessing government services without a guardian’s permission were also relaxed a few months earlier. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

13 " Abdul Aziz had won the loyalty of the warring tribes, cities, and regional sheikhs through military might, strategic marriages, and political patronage. He had not formed an imagined community or collective ideology, as many other peoples in the modern era had used as a basis for unity. Rather, the threat of the king’s military might and his largesse held the country together. This was part of the bargain that legitimized Abdul Aziz’s rule—he won his crown by force but kept his crown by showing his people that he had the wealth and power to provide for them. They were his subjects for as long as he could show them he had the ability to care for them as king. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

14 " When Feisal took control of the government, he found the financial situation much more dire than he had expected. The story told later was that the state treasury contained the equivalent of barely $100 in cash. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

15 " Back in 1947, Saudi Arabia lacked basic modern infrastructure. At the time, IBI was already completing projects for Aramco, so the company had been the natural choice to contract for the public works campaign in 1947. By 1951, however, major cities were already electrified and transportation routes had been built. Sanitation services, hospitals, hotels, and even cafés had sprung up around Riyadh and Jeddah. The equipment, plans, and logistics for further expansions were in place. The easily accessible knowledge and personnel that, in the 1940s, made IBI such an advantageous choice now took a back seat to cost. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

16 " Tim Barger, the son of Aramco geologist Tom Barger, was the seventh American born in Saudi Arabia. He explained that Dhahran, Aramco’s headquarters located in the region where oil was originally found, was “deliberately placed there, away from society” because “the King didn’t really want Americans to mingle with Saudis anyway.” His impression of Abdul Aziz was that the king “just wanted Americans to go there, stay out of his hair, and produce oil and make him rich. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power

17 " Even though Saudis eventually came to occupy the senior management positions in the company, Aramco remained an oasis of Western culture and business standards within the conservative and traditional kingdom. Nothing, al Saud believed, should get in the way of profit and power. "

― , Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom's Pursuit of Profit and Power