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21 " Sardar Patel, in as early as 1950, drew Nehru's attention to the threat posed by China.In a detailed letter containing some truly prophetic formulations about China's intentions and plans, he warned JN of the dangers of complacency and strongly urged a serious reconsideration of the entire China policy and the various steps that needed to be taken to meet the new situation.The Sardar said, in his letter:"Thus, for the first time after centuries, India’s defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously.Our defence measure have so far been based on the calculations of a superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with Communist China in the north and in the north-east, a Communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us. In my judgement, the situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating.We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policy to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident. "
― P.V. Narasimha Rao , The Insider
22 " Close studies reveal that the debacle of 1962 didn't occur for want of men and equipment., for there was enough of both, but it was rather spread out all over India. It may not have been available at a particular place, because we had to face the situation rather suddenly and we didn't have time.General Thimayya, then COAS, wrote an article in July 1962 that as a soldier, he couldn't envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own because China's military strength, with the full support of the USSR, exceeded India's military resourced a hundredfold. The only way to counter Chinese aggression on the border, according to him, was to attack the enemy in the Himalayan passes, which were practically impossible to cross for six months of the year.Here, the Indian Army could make full use of its manpower and light equipment against a Chinese force deprived of the use of its heavy equipment including tanks and heavy-calibre artillery.In case the Chinese got through to the plains and foothills, guerrilla tactics would have to be used to harass their lines of communication.The Indian Army's superior firepower and manoeuvrability would then have to be brought into play to defeat the enemy forces.As Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh later pointed out, there was insufficient appreciation of the problems of operating aircraft from high altitude airfields. If those problems had been thought through, there wouldn't have been as much reluctance to use Indian air power in support of our operations in 1962 as there actually was. "
23 " Today, in view of the rising political consciousness and the high cost of forcible occupation, we are no longer in an age where war can be used as an extension of foreign policy. This is the age of coercive diplomacy, when the projection of forces in intimidatory, deterrent and defensive roles has become an inextricable aspect of international relations. "