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1 " This obstacle which should be relentlessly combatted as a sign of narrow-minded party fanaticism and backward political culture, is reinforced for a journal like ours through the fact that in social sciences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is in actuality always given by practical "questions" Hence the very recognition of the existence of a scientific problem coincides personally, with the possession of specially oriented motives and values A Joumal which has come into existence under the Influence of a general interest in a concrete problem, will always include among its contributors persons who are personally Interested In these problems because certain concrete situations seem to be incompatible with, or seem to threaten. the realization of certain ideal values In which they belIeve. A bond of similar ideals will hold this circle of contrIbutors together and it will be the basis of a further recruitment. This in turn will tend to give the Journal, at least in its treatment of questions of practical social policy, a certain "character" which of course inevitably accompanies every collaboration of vigorously sensitive persons whose evaluative standpoint regarding the problems cannot be entirely expressed even In purely theoretical analysis; in the criticIsm of practIcal recommendations and measures it quite legitimately finds expression under the particular conditions above discussed. "
― Max Weber , The Methodology of the Social Sciences
2 " The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the realm of the world from the results of Its analysis, be it ever so perfect, it must rather be m a position to create this meaning itself. It must recognize that general Views of lIfe and the unIverse can never be the products of increasing empirIcal knowledge, and that the highest Ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only m the struggle with other Ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us. "
3 " It is true that we regard as objectively valuable those innermost elements of the "personalIty," those highest and most ultimate value-Judgments which determine our conduct and give meaning and significance to our life. We can indeed espouse these values only when they appear to us as valid, as derived from our highest values and when they are developed in the struggle against the difficulties which life presents. Certainly, the dignity of the "personality" lies in the fact that for it there exIst values about which It organizes its life; - even 1£ these values are m certain cases concentrated exclusively WIthin the sphere of the person's "individuality," then "self-realization" in those interests for which it claims validIty as values, is the idea wIth respect to which its whole existence is oriented. "
4 " An attitude of moral indifference has no connection with scientific "objectivity". "
