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21 " [T]he communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. "
― George Berkeley , A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
22 " The phenomena of nature, which strike on the senses and are understood by the mind, form not only a magnificent spectacle, but also a most coherent, entertaining, and instructive Discourse; and to effect this, they are conducted, adjusted, and ranged by the greatest wisdom. This Language or Discourse is studied with different attention, and interpreted with different degrees of skill. But so far as men have studied and remarked its rules, and can interpret right, so far they may be said to be knowing in nature. A beast is like a man who hears a strange tongue but understands nothing. "
― George Berkeley ,
23 " If the fact that brutes abstract not be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animal, I fear a great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number. "
― George Berkeley
24 " THE SECOND DIALOGUE "
― George Berkeley , Principles of Human Knowledge & Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous
25 " I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure NOTHING cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is therefore red. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word CHERRY you, mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its EXISTENCE something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists. "
― George Berkeley , Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous
26 " [THESE two tracts formed Berkeley’s first published matter. They appeared anonymously in 1707, written in Latin. They cannot be said to have any value other than the author’s name gives them. The translation used here is that of the Rev. G. N. Wright (“Works of Berkeley”, 1843).] "
― George Berkeley , Complete Works of George Berkeley
27 " Esse est percipi. "
28 " Mišljenje da kuće, planine, reke i, jednom rečju, svi čulni objekti, poseduju egzistenciju, prirodnu ili stvarnu, nezavisno od toga da li su opaženi razumom ili ne, zaista neobično preovlađuje među ljudima. Ali ma sa kolikim uverenjem ili slaganjem ovaj princip bio prihvaćen u svetu, ipak svako ko je spreman dag a ispita može, ako se ne varam, opaziti da sadrži očiglednu protivrečnost. Jer, šta su ti objekti do stvari koje opažamo čulima? I šta mi opažamo osim naših sopstvenih ideja ili osećaja? I nije li očigledno apsurdno da bi bilo koji od njih ili bilo koja njihova kombinacija mogla postojati neopaženo? "