143
" The contrast was quite stark, as was our duplicity,” he said. “The Poles and others publicly trumpeted their achievement of quick entry into NATO, so the Russians knew we had, more or less, lied to them. I never understood why we did this. It would have been much better to tell Yeltsin the truth and work with Moscow on how to manage the issue to improve ties between NATO and Russia. I think it was a characteristic of the Clinton Administration, especially in its relations with Russia, to believe it could have its cake and eat it too, that we could blatantly deceive the Russians about a matter of great importance to them without some loss of credence on their part in our word and in our intentions. Good diplomacy is not lying for your country, as is often said. Good diplomacy is being known as true to your word. "
― Tim Weiner , The Folly and the Glory: America, Russia, and Political Warfare 1945–2020
150
" The IRA created a new branch: the American Desk, also known as the Translator Department. It vetted its new hires for their fluency in American English, which was often slightly imperfect, and their feel for the nuances of American political discourse, which was usually quite impressive. It trained its internet-savvy young employees to understand the issues that divided Americans—gun rights, gay rights, immigration, the Confederate flag and its racist connotations. They learned how to argue online in ways that could "
― Tim Weiner , The Folly and the Glory: America, Russia, and Political Warfare 1945–2020
155
" Larry Diamond, a prominent American political sociologist, wrote in January 2015. “There is a growing sense, both domestically and internationally, that democracy in the United States has not been functioning effectively.” Voter turnouts were sinking. The cost of election campaigns was crushing. The role of dark money in politics was surging. Public trust in government was fading. Comity, courtesy, the consideration that the other person might have a point, were dying. Conspiracy theories were trending. Talking heads were shouting. Everyone was arguing with everybody "
― Tim Weiner , The Folly and the Glory: America, Russia, and Political Warfare 1945–2020
156
" Their campaign was “a vastly more complex and strategic assault on the United States than was initially understood,” the Senate Intelligence Committee reported in October 2019. The IRA reached tens of millions of voters. It connected with at least 126 million Americans on Facebook, 20 million people on Instagram, and 1.4 million on Twitter. This generated 76 million interactions on Facebook and 187 million engagements on Instagram; its Twitter accounts were retweeted by Trump, his sons, and his closest aides, among countless others, including some forty American journalists. The IRA’s posts and ripostes to support Trump—2,563 on Facebook, 13,106 on Instagram, 430,185 on Twitter—far exceeded its messages against his rivals. It uploaded more than a thousand videos to YouTube. It spent roughly $15 million all told, and it paid about one hundred Americans who organized forty different political protests across the United States. "
― Tim Weiner , The Folly and the Glory: America, Russia, and Political Warfare 1945–2020
158
" Stein, a Harvard-educated doctor, was unlike any presidential hopeful to proceed her. She practically ran on the United Russia ticket. She had announced her candidacy on RT’s American network, and Putin’s team clearly liked her critiques of American democracy and foreign policy. She had asserted in July 2015 that “we helped foment a coup against a democratically elected government” in Ukraine, “where ultra-nationalists and ex-Nazis came to power,” an exact echo of the Kremlin’s position. She was Putin’s honored guest at a televised banquet celebrating RT’s tenth anniversary. At the same table, smiling for the cameras, sat a remarkable contingent: Putin, Stein, a former KGB chieftain, Putin’s top propagandist, and retired lieutenant general Michael Flynn, who joined the Trump campaign six weeks after the banquet. "
― Tim Weiner , The Folly and the Glory: America, Russia, and Political Warfare 1945–2020
160
" It took eleven weeks to organize the hunt for Osama bin Laden. When that hunt began in earnest, I was in eastern Afghanistan, in and around Jalalabad, where I had traveled on five trips over the years. An old acquaintance named Haji Abdul Qadir had just reclaimed his post as the provincial governor, two days after the fall of the Taliban. Haji Qadir was an exemplar of Afghan democracy. A well-educated and highly cultured Pathan tribal leader in his early sixties, a wealthy dealer in opium and weapons and other basic staples of the Afghan economy, he had been a CIA-supported commander in the fight against the Soviet occupation, the governor of his province from 1992 to 1996, and a close associate of the Taliban in their time. He personally welcomed Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan and helped him establish a compound outside Jalalabad. Now he welcomed the American occupation. Haji Qadir was a good host. We walked in the gardens of the governor’s palace, through swayback palms and feathery tamarisks. He was expecting a visit from his American friends any day now, and he was looking forward to the renewal of old ties and the ritual exchange of cash for information. "
― Tim Weiner , Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA