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21 " An interesting tailpiece to this agitation was provided by a Tamil MP from the party carrying on the anti-Hindi movement.Anand knew him very well, having met him several times in Delhi.One day, the MP arrived at Palam airport from Madras at the same time as Anand was about to leave Delhi for Afrozabad. They happened to meet in the VIP lounge.The MP was accompanied by his teenage son, whom he introduced to Anand.Then, with some amount of paternal pride, he said, "You know, he is studying in Delhi and always comes first in his class in Hindi!"Surprised, Anand said, "And you don't know a word of Hindi and agitate against it all the time!""This is politics, you see?", said the MP. "
― P.V. Narasimha Rao , The Insider
22 " Anand was on tour in a distant village when the shattering news of the Chinese invasion was announced. Within hours, there was an astonishing metamorphosis in the prevailing atmosphere. Except for the lone troubled voice that came from the radio, there was a numbed silence all around. Every citizen was in the grip of an indescribable mixture of anger, anguish, a sense of disappointment, and above all, a feeling of unity with every other Indian.Just when Anand was about to leave, a lad of about ten came forward. He put his hand in his shirt pocket and produced a twenty-five paise coin. He held it out tentatively and stammered, "This is my contribution to defeat China..."Anand accepted the coin and hugged the boy. He controlled his emotion with some difficulty. The gesture electrified the atmosphere. For the first time faces brightened somewhat. "Why not raise a fund in the village?", said the Sarpanch."Yes!" interjected the villagers. "We must give and give and give until it hurts! Each a little more than he can afford to."God! Does this country need the threat of external aggression to unite it internally? wondered Anand, as his car turned into the highway. "
23 " Sardar Patel, in as early as 1950, drew Nehru's attention to the threat posed by China.In a detailed letter containing some truly prophetic formulations about China's intentions and plans, he warned JN of the dangers of complacency and strongly urged a serious reconsideration of the entire China policy and the various steps that needed to be taken to meet the new situation.The Sardar said, in his letter:"Thus, for the first time after centuries, India’s defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously.Our defence measure have so far been based on the calculations of a superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with Communist China in the north and in the north-east, a Communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us. In my judgement, the situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating.We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policy to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident. "
24 " Close studies reveal that the debacle of 1962 didn't occur for want of men and equipment., for there was enough of both, but it was rather spread out all over India. It may not have been available at a particular place, because we had to face the situation rather suddenly and we didn't have time.General Thimayya, then COAS, wrote an article in July 1962 that as a soldier, he couldn't envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own because China's military strength, with the full support of the USSR, exceeded India's military resourced a hundredfold. The only way to counter Chinese aggression on the border, according to him, was to attack the enemy in the Himalayan passes, which were practically impossible to cross for six months of the year.Here, the Indian Army could make full use of its manpower and light equipment against a Chinese force deprived of the use of its heavy equipment including tanks and heavy-calibre artillery.In case the Chinese got through to the plains and foothills, guerrilla tactics would have to be used to harass their lines of communication.The Indian Army's superior firepower and manoeuvrability would then have to be brought into play to defeat the enemy forces.As Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh later pointed out, there was insufficient appreciation of the problems of operating aircraft from high altitude airfields. If those problems had been thought through, there wouldn't have been as much reluctance to use Indian air power in support of our operations in 1962 as there actually was. "
25 " Today, in view of the rising political consciousness and the high cost of forcible occupation, we are no longer in an age where war can be used as an extension of foreign policy. This is the age of coercive diplomacy, when the projection of forces in intimidatory, deterrent and defensive roles has become an inextricable aspect of international relations. "
